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1 Introduction
One of the most relevant developments that characterize the global economy of the recent
decades is the rising importance of the so called “valuation channel” in accounting for
the dynamics of net foreign assets of many countries1. Since the early 1990s, cross-border
holdings of assets and liabilities have substantially increased and the traditional method
of computing the net foreign assets position of a country, which relied on the cumulation
of current account balances over time, has proved to be inaccurate2. As the balance of
payments does not record changes in the value of foreign assets and liabilities which can
arise due to fluctuations of nominal exchange rates and asset prices, it does not reflect
the fact that the valuation channel is becoming more important.
For instance, Figure 1 shows the discrepancy between the cumulated current account
balances and the net foreign assets position of the United States. According to the former
measure, the net foreign assets position of the United States amounted to almost −60%
of GDP in 2010. However, direct estimates of net foreign assets and liabilities suggest
that the net external position was much lower and equal to around −20% of GDP. This
implies that the US have experienced a substantial wealth transfer from the rest of the
world over the past 20 years as the value of their foreign assets has risen relatively to the
value of their foreign liabilities. The significance of the valuation channel is not specific to
the US. It is interesting to observe that emerging countries in East Asia have faced exactly
the opposite situation: while their net external positions have considerably improved over
the past decades because of current account surpluses, they have experienced negative
valuation effects (Figure 2)3. In all the countries considered in Figures 1 and 2, valuation
effects have had a stabilizing effect on the net foreign assets position.
The hypothesis of this paper, which is supported by the empirical literature, is that
part of these valuation effects can be attributed to fluctuations of nominal exchange rates4.
1See Gourinchas et al. (2015) for a recent survey of the literature.
2Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007) constructed estimates of foreign assets and liabilities for 145 countries for the
period 1970-2011 and were among the first to notice the mismatch between the stock measures (at current prices) and the
balance of payments data.
3Gourinchas et al. (2015) make similar observations for other emerging countries.
4Lane et al. (2010) and Benetrix et al. (2015) built a large database to document countries’ currency exposures and
found that exchange-rate driven valuation effects account for a significant fraction of the overall valuation effects. Another
source of valuation effects is fluctuations of asset prices, which lead to capital gains and losses on foreign assets and liabilities.
Since there is a relatively large literature on this channel, this paper will focus on modelling exchange-rate driven valuation
effects. E.g. see Pavlova et al. (2007, 2010), Tille et al. (2010), Devereux et al. (2010), Nguyen (2011), Ghironi et al.
(2015) and Stepanchuk et al. (2015).
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Gourinchas et al. (2007) have shown that a significant part of the US cyclical external
imbalances are eliminated via predictable movements in nominal exchange rates. The ex-
change rate, through the valuation channel, has therefore a crucial role in the adjustment
of the US net external position along with the traditional trade balance channel.
It is well known that the way in which the valuation channel operates depends on
the currency composition of a country’s foreign assets and liabilities. The United States
tend to issue foreign liabilities in dollars while the majority of their foreign assets are
denominated in foreign currencies: as a result, the positive valuation effects experienced
over the past twenty years should be associated with a depreciation of the dollar against
the currencies of the main US lenders. Indeed, Figure 3 shows the steady depreciation of
the dollar against the currencies of East Asian, emerging economies, especially since 20045.
Although the valuation channel is empirically relevant for many countries, Gourinchas
et al. (2015) have recently stressed that designing models able to generate meaningful
expected valuation effects has proved to be a challenge.
This paper takes up this task and proposes a two-country model of nominal exchange
rate determination and endogenous portfolio choice to shed light on the role of the nominal
exchange rate in countries’ portfolio choices as well as its impact on the dynamics of net
external positions through valuation effects.
The novelty of this model is that both portfolio allocations and the nominal exchange
rate are endogenous and can be uniquely determined in equilibrium. As a consequence, the
patterns in the data can be explained purely as the result of changes in the fundamentals
of the two economies6. In particular, the idea behind this paper is that the stylized facts
presented in Figures 1-3 can be explained as the result of the rise of emerging market
countries in the world economy, as measured by their share of world GDP. In fact, Figure
4 shows the steady increase in the share of world GDP of East Asian countries relatively
to the US over the past twenty years. As we would expect, China accounts for a huge
part of this trend.
Our two-country model has two key ingredients. Firstly, financial markets are incom-
5While China and Malaysia do not have a fully flexible exchange rate regime, controls on foreign exchange markets have
eased over time (see e.g. IMF, 2014) leading to considerable currency appreciations.
6For instance, Tille (2008) analyzes the wealth effects of exchange rate fluctuations assuming that portfolios are exoge-
nous. Benigno (2009) investigates the extent to which the valuation channel due to the exchange rate is desirable from a
normative point of view in a model where each country can borrow (lend) in a risk-free nominal bond denominated in its
(the other country) currency. As the asset positions and the nominal exchange rate are indeterminate at the steady state,
he calibrates the former and restricts the path of the nominal exchange rate.
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Figure 1: Net foreign assets’ position and cumulated current accounts of the United States as a percentage
of GDP, 1970-2010
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Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti's database (2007).
Figure 2: Net foreign assets’ position and cumulated current accounts of selected East Asian countries
as a percentage of GDP
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Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti database (2007). 
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Figure 3: The depreciation of the US dollar against the currencies of selected East Asian countries
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Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti database (2007). Updated to 2011. 
Figure 4: The share of world GDP of East Asian countries relatively to the US
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Source. IMF World Economic Outlook database. Notes. Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP)
share of world total relatively to the US.
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plete. Incomplete markets is an essential feature for open economy models with endoge-
nous portfolio choice: it is well known that complete markets’ models are not suitable
to explain the dynamics of foreign assets and liabilities (gross positions) as portfolios are
constant across states of nature in equilibrium7. Our economy is populated by a sequence
of overlapping generations, who receive an endowment of a country-specific good when
born. Therefore, markets are incomplete in the sense that agents cannot insure against
the realization of output that they receive. Secondly, agents lack of a complete set of
assets to insure against the risk that they face in the second period of life. The way in
which agents can transfer wealth across periods is to buy a portfolio of currencies. We
will refer to a country’s holdings of the foreign currency as “foreign assets” while the
foreign country’s holdings of the domestic currency as “foreign liabilities”. Because the
asset structure is simple, it is very tractable and at the same time it has the necessary
elements to capture the currency composition of both the US and emerging countries,
for which the majority of foreign assets are denominated in foreign currencies while the
majority of foreign liabilities are issued in the domestic currency8.
The second ingredient relates to the way in which currencies and goods are traded in
the economy. We adopt a cash-in-advance specification as in Lucas (1982), which means
that each currency can only buy the country-specific good9. However, we require that
agents must commit themselves to money holdings before learning the realization of the
shock that is going to hit them (in the second period of their lives). In conventional
cash-in-advance models, agents purchase money balances after the shock is realized and
hence the prices of the goods (and, in an open economy, the nominal exchange rate)
are known to them. As Lucas (1982) himself suggests, reversing the sequence in which
information flows gives rise to a precautionary demand for money as it introduces a further
element of uncertainty in agents’ decisions. As agents have finite lives in an OLG model,
this structure basically implies that only a fraction of agents in the economy (the young)
make a decision about portfolios in each period10. In this framework, we show that assets’
7See Lucas (1982) for an open economy version of the Lucas asset-pricing model and Judd et al. (2003) for a proof of
the same result in a more general version of the model.
8Lane et al. (2010) have shown that emerging countries are increasingly similar to developed economies as they are now
able to issue the majority of their liabilities in domestic currency, differently from developing economies. Although part of
their liabilities are denominated in dollars, East Asian countries (such as China) are net lenders therefore a depreciation of
the dollar is still associated with negative valuation effects.
9See Alvarez et al. (2009) for a more recent treatment of cash-in-advance models.
10As Bacchetta et al. (2010) observe, portfolio decisions are typically not made on a continuous basis but they tend to
be infrequent. They show that “infrequent portfolio decisions” can explain the forward discount puzzle in an OLG model.
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positions and the nominal exchange rate are determined. If we reversed the way in which
information flows in the model, the two currencies would be perfectly substitutable hence
we would not be able to pin down a portfolio allocation and the exchange rate. This is
nothing but the indeterminacy result pointed out by the seminal paper of Kareken and
Wallace (1981)11. The presence of cash-in-advance constraints alone is not enough to
guarantee the determinacy of the nominal exchange rate, since money has the double role
of medium of exchange and store of value in our overlapping-generations setting. In order
for the currencies not to be perfect substitutes as stores of value, it is crucial that agents
pre-commit to money holdings before the shock is observed12.
In this setting, the nominal exchange rate operates through two different, but related
channels. Firstly, it has an impact on the portfolio decisions of the agents. In fact, while
it is rational for agents to buy currencies that depreciate, as they are relatively cheaper,
they also have an incentive to buy those currencies which are expected to have a higher
purchasing power in the future. Secondly, fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate have
an impact on the net foreign assets position of a country as they generate valuation effects.
This paper provides an interpretation of the stylized facts presented in Figures 1-4, as
it explains both the deterioration of the US net external position against emerging market
economies and the positive valuation effects that they experienced over the past twenty
years as the consequence of emerging countries’ increase in their share of world GDP. In
fact, we show that the country that runs a current account surplus in equilibrium is the
country whose share of world GDP has increased over time. In the numerical exercises, we
will focus on China as it is the country whose share of world GDP has increased the most
since the early 1990s, because of its rapid output growth. As the current generation in
China is wealthier with respect to the previous generation, the young Chinese accumulate
more domestic as well as foreign assets than in the past and this causes an improvement
of the net foreign assets position of the country, consistently with Figure 2.
The overlapping generations structure is crucial to obtain this result, as the trade
balance is driven by the consumption of the old as well as the current generation. In a
two-period overlapping generations economy, it is known that the young are net savers
whenever their income when old is low as compared to their income when young (i.e.
11Manuelli and Peck (1990) extended Kareken et al.’s result to a stochastic framework. Sargent (1987) showed that the
indeterminacy result holds more generally and is not due to the OLG structure. The indeterminacy in Benigno (2009) is
also due to the perfect substitutability between the domestic and the foreign bond.
12See Appendix A for an illustration of this point.
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in Samuelsonian economies). However, at aggregate level, the country could be either
borrowing or lending from abroad as part of the aggregate consumption also comes from
the old people in the economy. In this sense, it is the comparison between the current
and the past distribution of wealth that matters when it comes to determining the net
position of the country versus the rest of the world13. We also run some panel regressions
for a large cross-section of countries for the period 1981-2011 to show that the validity of
our mechanism goes beyond explaining the trade balance position of the United versus
East Asian economies. In fact, we find that there exists a positive, statistically significant
relationship between the current account balance and changes in the share of world GDP.
In other words, a country whose share of world GDP has increased with respect to the
previous period is more likely to experience a surplus of the current account balance.
Excluding the US and China from the sample does not affect this result.
While the United States’ net foreign assets position against China deteriorates, the
dollar depreciates and this generates positive valuation effects for the US. The mecha-
nism is very intuitive and can be explained as follows. Suppose that the young living
both in China and the US expect that the world economy will remain in the current state
of nature with high probability. As the Chinese goods are cheaper than in the past due
to the country’s higher output growth, the demand for the Chinese currency increases
because it is expected that it will have a high purchasing power. As the currency ap-
preciates in equilibrium, the value of the foreign currency held by US residents increases
relatively to the value of the US currency held abroad. Therefore, the surplus (deficit)
country experiences negative (positive) valuation effects, consistently with the stylized
facts presented for the US and East Asian economies. The result that valuation effects
are stabilizing is obtained under the mild condition that there is some degree of output
persistence in the economy. The stabilizing nature of valuation effects is also in line with
the empirical findings of Lane et al. (2002) and Devereux et al. (2010).
The numerical results show that valuation effects are quantitatively relevant. While
we can explain almost a third of the US-China trade imbalances, valuation effects reduce
13In a framework with infinitely-lived agents, Engel et al. (2006) emphasize the role of the expected share of world output
as opposed to the past share of world GDP. In particular, they show that a country borrows from the rest of the world if
the country is expected to grow in the future. Their mechanism is different because the trade balance is entirely driven
by the desire of consumption smoothing of the representative agent. While their model is able to capture the US position
vis-a`-vis other industrialized countries, it falls short of explaining the deterioration of the US external position against East
Asian economies since East Asian fast-growing economies are not borrowing from the rest of the world.
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the impact of the US current account deficit on the net foreign assets position by more
than a half, consistently with the data. This result is not particularly sensitive to our
chosen parametrization of the model.
Another contribution of this paper is that the model can generate significantly large
expected valuation effects. More precisely, the valuation channel accounts for almost half
of the net foreign assets position of the US in our benchmark case. So long as China
is expected to grow relatively more than the US, the model suggests that we should
expect a deterioration of the US net external position through a trade deficit as well as
positive valuation effects through a depreciation of the dollar. Our results are consistent
with the empirical literature in pointing out that the valuation channel is crucial for
the process of external adjustment (Gourinchas et al., 2007). Our theory also suggests
a plausible mechanism driving the adjustment of countries’ net foreign assets positions
through both the trade balance and the valuation channel: expected growth differentials
across countries.
In previous models of asset price-driven valuation effects, the adjustment of the net
foreign assets’ position entirely operates through the trade balance channel. For instance,
this is the case in the analytically tractable model of Pavlova et al. (2007, 2010, 2015),
probably because of the logarithmic specification (see also Gourinchas et al., 2015). Tille
et al. (2010) and Devereux et al. (2010) resort to higher-order approximations around the
deterministic steady state to compute portfolios, as they are indeterminate at the point
of approximation. In this class of models, the expected return differential is negligible.
Tille et al. (2010) and Ghironi et al. (2015) point out that while expected valuation
effects are significant, they are completely offset by movements in dividend income. As
a consequence, the trade balance channel is still the only driving force of a country’s
external adjustment from a quantitative point of view. In this paper, the predictable
return differential has instead a large expected component. This is not because there is no
stream of interest payments associated with holding money, which could potentially offset
exchange rate movements: our result is rather due to our friction in currency markets,
which leads to a lack of perfect arbitrage across currencies.
The solution method that we adopt is the numerical computation of the stochastic
steady state of the model, which is defined as a time-invariant distribution (across state
of nature) of nominal prices, exchange rates, consumption and portfolio allocations. Under
some parameter restrictions, we show that the model is partially analytically tractable as
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the demand functions have closed-form solutions14.
In sections 2, we present the model and define net foreign assets as well as valuation
effects in the context of our framework. In section 3, we derive our main analytical result
on the relationship between the trade balance and the share of world GDP. In section 4,
we parametrize the model to show that it can rationalize the above stylized facts on the
dynamics of the net foreign assets of the US and East Asian countries, while in section
5 we conduct a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate that the results are quite robust to
alternative parameter specifications. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We consider the following two-country overlapping generations economy. In each period,
an agent h with a two-period lifetime is born in each country. Therefore, two young and
two old populate the world economy at each date.
The young are born with an endowment of the country-specific good `, which is also
the total output of the country. Output is denoted as y`(s) as it depends on the state
of nature realized, where s = {1, ..., S}. We will use the superscript ` to indicate goods
and currencies, while we will refer to agents with the subscript h. We assume that
output follows a Markov chain, where transition probabilities are time-invariant and ρ(ss′)
indicates the probability of transiting from state s to s′. Agents gain utility from the
consumption of both goods although they are only endowed with the country-specific
good, as in Lucas (1982).
At time 0, the two governments issue fiat money and distribute it to the initial old.
M ` is the stock of money issued in country `. As the old have no endowment, money is
valued in equilibrium as agents would not be able to consume in their second period of
life otherwise. For simplicity, we assume that monetary authorities are inactive after the
first period.
Our objective is to characterize the stationary equilibrium of the model, therefore
prices will not depend on the history of the shocks but only on the current state of
nature. Therefore, agents born in the same state of nature although at different dates
have the same consumption allocation.
14Rabitsch et al. (2015) and Coeurdacier et al. (2012) point out that one of the advantages of solving the stochastic
steady state of models with endogenous portfolio choice is a higher degree of accuracy of the results, both qualitatively and
quantitatively.
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Agent h born in state s has the following utility function:
Uh(s) =
c1h(s)
1−γ
1− γ + β
∑
s′
ρ(ss′)
c2h(ss
′)1−γ
1− γ (1)
where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and c1h(s) and c2h(ss
′) are the constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregators:
c1h(s) ≡
[
a1h
1
σ c11h(s)
σ−1
σ + a2h
1
σ c21h(s)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
(2)
c2h(ss
′) ≡
[
a1h
1
σ c12h(ss
′)
σ−1
σ + a2h
1
σ c22h(ss
′)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
(3)
where a1h + a
2
h = 1, σ > 0 and σ 6= 1.
Taking as given the vector of transition probabilities, the goods’ prices and the nominal
exchange rate, agent h born in state s then chooses the consumption vectors and the
portfolio of currencies that maximize (1) subject to (2), (3) and the following constraints:
m¯1h(s) + e(s)m¯
2
h(s) = wh(s) (4)
m1h(s) + p
1(s)c11h(s) = m¯
1
h(s) (5)
m2h(s) + p
2(s)c21h(s) = m¯
2
h(s) (6)
p1(s′)c12h(ss
′) = m1h(s) ∀ s′ (7)
p2(s′)c22h(ss
′) = m2h(s) ∀ s′ (8)
Agent h is born with an initial wealth wh(s), which is equal to the value of the domestic
output expressed in units of currency 1 (the nume´raire): w1(s) ≡ p1(s)y1(s) and w2(s) ≡
p2(s)e(s)y2(s). p1(s) (p2(s)) is the price of good 1 (2) expressed in units of currency 1
(2). We assume that the law of one price holds, hence producers set prices in their own
currency15. e(s) is the price of currency 2 in units of currency 1 or the nominal exchange
rate. Therefore, we say that if e(s) rises then currency 2 (1) appreciates (depreciates).
With his wealth, the agent buys the two currencies for the purpose of financing the
consumption of the domestic and foreign good as well as for saving purposes. m¯h(s) is
the portfolio of currencies held at the beginning of the period. The second and the third
constraints are the cash-in-advance constraints faced by the young, where mh(s) is the
end-of-period portfolio.
For the old agents, the timing is structured as follows. Firstly, the state of nature re-
alizes. Secondly, the previously accumulated currencies are spent in the respective goods’
15This is not a restrictive assumption, considering that this is a flexible price, long-run model. For instance, Campa et
al. (2006) have shown that there is full exchange rate pass-through in the long-run for many types of imported goods.
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markets. As a consequence of the fact that they cannot adjust their previous portfolio
decision, the old effectively face as many constraints as the number of goods for each state
of nature (instead of a single budget constraint). As we explained in the introduction,
the way in which information flows in the model introduces a further element of risk. As
agents pre-commit to money holdings before the value of the shock is known to them,
agents pick a portfolio of currencies forming expectations about the purchasing power of
the two currencies next period. This structure ensures the determinacy of portfolios and
the nominal exchange rate in a framework where currencies are used not only as a media
of exchange, but also as stores of value16.
We can consolidate the constraints of the young (4), (5) and (6) into a single budget
constraint and rewrite the problem as follows:
p1(s)c11h(s) + p
2(s)e(s)c21h(s)− wh(s) = −m1h(s)− e(s)m2h(s) (9)
p1(s′)c12h(ss
′) = m1h(s) ∀ s′ (10)
p2(s′)c22h(ss
′) = m2h(s) ∀ s′ (11)
For analytical convenience, we will assume that the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution, which is the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ, is equal to the
elasticity of substitution between the traded goods σ17:
Assumption 1 1
γ
= σ.
Let λh(s) be the multiplier associated to the young’s budget constraint, λ
`
h(ss
′) the multi-
plier of the constraint of the old related to good ` in state s′. The necessary and sufficient
16See Appendix A for further considerations.
17 This parameter restriction allows us to derive the demand functions for the two currencies analytically, which is
very helpful to gain intuition of the main mechanisms. In the sensitivity analysis, we will show that the qualitative and
quantitative results obtained under this restriction are robust for commonly assumed values of γ and σ.
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conditions for a maximum are the following:
c11h(s) : a
1
h
1
σ c11h(s)
− 1
σ = λh(s)p
1(s) (12)
c21h(s) : a
2
h
1
σ c21h(s)
− 1
σ = λh(s)p
2(s)e(s) (13)
c`2h(ss
′) : βa`h
1
σ ρ(ss′)c`2h(ss
′)
− 1
σ = λ`h(ss
′)p`(s′) ∀ `, s′ (14)
m1h(s) : −λh(s) +
∑
s′
λ1h(ss
′) = 0 (15)
m2h(s) : −λh(s)e(s) +
∑
s′
λ2h(ss
′) = 0 (16)
λh(s) : p
1(s)c11h(s) + p
2(s)e(s)c21h(s)− wh(s) +
+ m1h(s) + e(s)m
2
h(s) = 0 (17)
λ1h(ss
′) : p1(s′)c12h(ss
′)−m1h(s) = 0 ∀ s′ (18)
λ2h(ss
′) : p2(s′)c22h(ss
′)−m2h(s) = 0 ∀ s′ (19)
In Appendix A, we show how to find the following closed-form solutions for the agents’
demand functions for the two currencies:
m1h(s) =
a1hβ
σ
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p1(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ
Ah(s)
wh(s) (20)
m2h(s) =
a2hβ
σe(s)1−σ
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p2(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ
Ah(s)
wh(s)
e(s)
(21)
where
Ah(s) ≡ a1hp1(s)1−σ + a2h[p2(s)e(s)]1−σ + a1hβσ
[∑
s′
ρ(ss′)p1(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ
+
+ a2hβ
σe(s)1−σ
[∑
s′
ρ(ss′)p2(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ
Agent h’s demand functions for the goods can be derived using (20), (21) and the
budget constraints18:
c11h(s) =
a1hp
1(s)
−σ
Ah(s)
wh(s) ∀ ` (22)
c21h(s) =
a2h[p
2(s)e(s)]−σ
Ah(s)
wh(s) ∀ ` (23)
c12h(ss
′) =
a1hβ
σ
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p1(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ
Ah(s)
wh(s)
p1(s′)
∀ s′ (24)
c22h(ss
′) =
a2hβ
σe(s)−σ
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p2(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ
Ah(s)
wh(s)
p2(s′)
∀ s′ (25)
18The procedure to calculate the demand functions when young is provided in Appendix A.
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As preferences are homothetic, the demand for each good is a linear function of wealth
where the multiplicative term is a complicated non-linear function of current and future
prices as well as the nominal exchange rate.
2.1 The role of the nominal exchange rate: partial equilibrium
Using equations (14), (15) and (16), we can obtain the following expression for the nominal
exchange rate:
e(s) =
a2h
a1h
∑
s′ ρ(ss
′) c
2
2h(ss
′)−
1
σ
p2(s′)∑
s′ ρ(ss
′) c
1
2h(ss
′)−
1
σ
p1(s′)
s = 1, ..., S (26)
In our model, the nominal exchange rate is a forward-looking variable, as it depends on
the expected marginal utilities derived from the consumption of the two goods as well as
from the expected purchasing power of the two currencies. In fact, 1
p`(s′) gives how many
units of good ` we can afford in state s′ per unit of currency ` held. In other words, the
nominal exchange rate is the ratio of the expected purchasing power of currency 2 over
the expected purchasing power of currency 1, weighted by agent h’s marginal utilities.
The more a currency can buy tomorrow relatively to the other currency, the higher will
be its price today. This means that the nominal exchange rate follows some sort of asset
pricing equation, given that the currencies are used to transfer wealth across periods19.
Let us now look at the portfolio decision of an agent in more detail. We combine the
demand for the two currencies (20) and (21) to get:
m1h(s)
m2h(s)
= e(s)σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
nominal exchange rate
· a
1
h
a2h︸︷︷︸
goods’ weights
·
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p1(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p2(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected nominal prices
(27)
The portfolio decision of each agent depends on three sets of variables: the nominal
exchange rate, the weights of the two goods in the utility function, the expected future
prices of the two goods.
Firstly, as currency 2 becomes more expensive (e(s) increases) the relative demand
for currency 1 increases. Secondly, the relative demand for currency 1 rises with the
weight of good 1 in agent h’s utility function. The equation also shows that the impact
19In the cash-in-advance literature, the spot exchange rate simply depends on the current realization of the stochastic
variables and not on expectations of future variables (see e.g. Lucas (1982)). This is due to the transaction role that it is
attributed to money, which is only used to carry out exchange in a given period. In Lucas (1982), money is a “veil” and
the exchange rate does not ultimately affect the real allocation, which is the same as in the barter economy.
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of future prices on portfolio choices depends on the degree of substitutability between
the two goods, which in turn determines the degree of substitutability between the two
currencies. In general, if it is expected that a good will be relatively cheaper, then the
associated currency will have a higher purchasing power. If σ > 1, the demand for such
currency would increase as the substitution effect is sufficiently high.
Obviously, these arguments about the role of the nominal exchange rate on the portfo-
lio choice of the agents are of a partial equilibrium nature, as agents take prices and the
nominal exchange rate as given. Below, we will show the importance of general equilib-
rium analysis as the nominal exchange rate moves in equilibrium to offset the expected
price differentials across countries.
2.2 Stationary equilibrium
Definition 1 A stationary equilibrium is a system of prices and nominal exchange rates
(p, e) ∈ R2S++ × RS++, consumption allocations and portfolios
(c1h(s), c2h(ss
′),mh(s)) ∈ R2++ × R2S++ × R2++ for every h = 1, ..., H and s = 1, ..., S such
that:
(i) agent h maximizes his utility function (1) subject to the budget constraints (9), (10)
and (11) in every s;
(ii) c`1(s) + c
`
2(s
′s) = y`(s) ∀ s, s′ and ∀ `
(iii)
∑
hm
`
h(s) = M
` ∀ s, `
where c`1(s) ≡
∑
h c
`
1h(s) and c
`
2(s
′s) ≡∑h c`2h(s′s).
In the previous section, we have shown how to compute analytically the demand func-
tions for the goods and the currencies. Therefore, the number of endogenous variables
that we need to compute reduces to 3S, i.e. the two nominal prices and the exchange
rate in each state of nature. The number of equations is instead 2S + 2S2. 2S refer to
the two money markets, which have to clear in each state of nature while 2S2 are the two
goods’ markets, which have to clear for any pair of s and s′ as the consumption of the old
depends on the state when born as well as the current state. In Appendix B, we show
that the goods’ markets equations that are apparently in excess are actually redundant, so
that solving the model actually reduces to handling a non-linear system of 3S equations
and unknowns.
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Before solving the model, we introduce some key definitions and make some useful
remarks.
2.3 Portfolio rebalancing and trade imbalances: a unified view
To start with, let us define the balance of trade of country 1 in state s, where s′ is the
state of nature in the previous period20:
TB1(s
′s) ≡ p1(s)[y1(s)− c111(s)− c121(s′s)]− p2(s)e(s)[c211(s) + c221(s′s)]
Notice that the sign of the balance of trade depends on the choices that the young make
in the current period, but also on the choices made by the current old in the previous
period. Substituting the budget constraints into the trade balance equation, it should be
immediate that the above definition can be rewritten as:
TB1(s
′s) = m11(s)−m11(s′) + e(s)[m21(s)−m21(s′)] (28)
This leads us to the following remarks:
Remark 1 The balance of trade is zero if: (i) portfolios are constant across states of
nature; (ii) this period’s realized state is the same as last period’s.
Equation (28) shows that there is a close relationship between currency markets and the
goods’ markets. If, for some reason, there is no portfolio rebalancing in equilibrium, then
the balance of trade is always balanced. In Appendix B, we show that this behaviour oc-
curs e.g. when utility functions are logarithmic. The demand functions become extremely
simple as they do not depend on future prices, and the model is fully tractable. Constant
portfolios imply that the consumption of an old person does not depend on the state in
which he is born but only on the state realized when old.As we explained in the intro-
duction, this is a prediction at odds with the reality of international financial markets.
When the elasticity of substitution is different than one, we will show that agents born
in different states of nature have different demands for the goods which is then reflected
in their demand for the two currencies21.
The second part of the remark is related to the result of Polemarchakis et al. (2002)
for deterministic OLG economies. In a monetary union with no uncertainty, they showed
20Obviously, by Walras Law we have that TB2(s′s) = −TB1(s′s).
21Our finding for the log case is related to Cass and Pavlova (2004), who showed that the matrix of portfolio returns is
degenerate in a two-period economy with N Lucas trees. A similar result holds in the infinite-horizon setting of Pavlova
and Rigobon (2007, 2010), who then introduce demand shocks to generate time-varying portfolios.
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that the balance of trade is always in equilibrium at the monetary steady state. In this
paper, the monetary steady state is stochastic and trade imbalances are possible whenever
s 6= s′.
Next, we decompose the trade balance equation to highlight valuation effects and the
change in net foreign assets.
2.4 Net foreign assets dynamics and a decomposition of valuation effects
In this section, we explore the relationship between net foreign assets, the balance of trade
and valuation effects. Consider the balance of trade of country 1 in state s′s, where s′
is the past state and s is the current state, as defined in the previous section (equation
(28)). Using the fact that m11(s) +m
1
2(s) = M
1 for every s, we can rewrite it as follows:
TB1(s
′s) = m12(s
′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
FL1(s′)
−m12(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
FL1(s)
+ e(s)m21(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
FA1(s)
− e(s)m21(s′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
current value FA1(s′)
(29)
where FA(s) and FL(s) stand respectively for “foreign assets” and “foreign liabilities”,
which, in this context, are a country’s holdings of foreign currency and the foreign coun-
try’s holdings of the domestic currency. Next, define net foreign assets as NFA(s) ≡
FA(s)− FL(s) and rewrite the above as follows:
NFA1(s) = current value NFA1(s
′) + TB1(s′s) (30)
Equation (30) states that the end-of-period net foreign assets in country 1 is equal to the
current value of the net foreign assets accumulated in the previous period plus the trade
balance22.
The next step is to rewrite equation (29) in order to highlight the valuation effects in
this model. We can do that by summing and subtracting the foreign assets of country 1
in the previous state (e(s′)m21(s
′)) in the right hand side and using the definition of net
foreign assets:
TB1(s
′s) = NFA1(s)−NFA1(s′) + [e(s′)− e(s)]m21(s′) (31)
This equation can be rewritten as:
∆NFA1(s
′s) = TB1(s′s) + r(s′s)FA1(s′) = TB1(s′s) + V AL1(s′s) (32)
22This equation is equivalent to equation (1) in Gourinchas and Rey (2007, footnote 2).
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where
r(s′s) ≡ R(s′s)− 1 ≡ e(s)
e(s′)
− 1 (33)
V AL1(s
′s) ≡ r(s′s)FA1(s′) (34)
The change in the net foreign assets position of country 1 will be determined by the be-
haviour of the balance of trade and the valuation effects, where r(s′s) is the return on the
foreign assets accumulated in the previous period23. In this model, valuation effects are
entirely determined by exchange rate movements. If foreign currencies have appreciated
with respect to the past (i.e. e(s) > e(s′)), then the return on the foreign assets accumu-
lated in the previous period is positive and therefore we say that the country experiences
positive valuation effects24. Conversely, a country experiences negative valuation effects
if the foreign currency has depreciated.
Gourinchas et al. (2015) recently stressed that one of the challenges for open economy
models with endogenous portfolio choice is to be able to come up with a model that
generates substantial expected valuation effects as opposed to unexpected valuation effects.
In fact, Gourinchas et al. (2007) have shown empirically that the valuation channel is a
critical component of the process of external adjustment of the US, and the exchange rate
component is a fundamental force behind that.
To be able explore this issue later on, we decompose V AL1(s
′s), which are the valuation
effects that country 1 would actually experience in the transition from state s′ to state
s, into an expected and an unexpected component. Firstly, we can write the valuation
effects expected in state s′ as follows:
Es′sV AL1(s
′s) ≡ FA1(s′)Es′sr(s′s) (35)
where Es′s is the expectation operator which is conditional on the world economy being
in state s′. Equation (35) indicates that expected valuation effects are not zero in the
model as long as the expected return on the foreign assets’ position, which is driven by
nominal exchange rates fluctuations, is different from zero.
Hence, the unexpected component is simply the difference between the actual (realized)
23Notice that there is no net income from abroad and therefore the trade balance position is equivalent to the current
account position.
24As the price of the foreign asset is defined in units of the domestic asset, i.e. the exchange rate, the above rate of return
has to be interpreted as the return of foreign assets relatively to the return on foreign liabilities.
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and the expected valuation effects:
UNV AL1(s
′s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unexpected val. effects
= V AL1(s
′s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
actual val. effects
− Es′sV AL1(s′s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected val. effects
=
= FA1(s
′)[r(s′s)− Es′sr(s′s)] (36)
We can also derive a forward-looking expression for the net foreign assets position of
country 1 in state s′ to highlight the role of expected valuation effects in the dynamics
of the net foreign assets’ position of the country. The change in the net foreign assets
position between s and s′ must satisfy the following equation:
NFA1(s)−NFA1(s′) = TB1(s′s) + V AL1(s′s) ∀ s
Multiplying each equation by the probability that state s realizes next period given that
the current state is s′ and summing across the S equations, we get:
NFA1(s
′) = Es′sNFA1(s)− Es′sTB1(s′s)− Es′sV AL1(s′s) (37)
Equation (37) shows that the net foreign assets position of country 1 in state s′ can be
written as a function of the expected net foreign assets position, the trade balance and
valuation effects25.
Before showing the behavior as well as the quantitative importance of expected val-
uation effects in the dynamics of net foreign assets, in section 3 we show that portfolio
rebalancing, and therefore trade imbalances, occurs in equilibrium whenever there are
changes in countries’ share of world GDP.
3 The distribution of world GDP, portfolio rebalancing and
trade imbalances
In this section only, we assume that there is no home bias (a1h = a
2
h) as this case is
very helpful to develop some key intuitions about the model. The following Proposition
establishes that there is a strong relationship between the distribution of world GDP
across countries, portfolio holdings and trade imbalances when preferences are identical
across countries.
25In Gourinchas et al. (2007), the first term in the right-hand side does not appear as their analytical expression is based
on the assumption that the no-Ponzi game condition holds. While this is always the case when agents are infinitely-lived,
we do not have to impose such restriction on the economy in an overlapping-generations setting. We will see that this will
have important consequences for the dynamics of net foreign assets.
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Proposition 1 Assume that a1h = a
2
h. (i) A country’s portfolio holdings at the end of a
period are linearly related to its current share of world GDP.
(ii) If a country has a higher (lower) share of world GDP with respect to the past, it runs
a trade surplus (deficit).
Proof.
(i) The demand of agent h for the two currencies is linear in wealth (see equations (20)
and (21)):
m`h(s) = k
`(s)wh(s)
where k`(s) is identical across agents if a1h = a
2
h. Summing across h and assuming
that the money markets clear, we get the following equation:
M ` = k`(s)
∑
h
wh(s)
Dividing the first equation by the second equation and rearranging, we obtain the
desired result:
m`h(s) =
wh(s)
w(s)
M ` ` = 1, 2
where w(s) =
∑
hwh(s)
26.
(ii) Suppose that today’s realized state is s and yesterday’s state was s′ and assume that
wh(s)
w(s)
> wh(s
′)
w(s′) . Our previous result implies that:
m`h(s) > m
`
h(s
′) ` = 1, 2
As the young born in the current period hold a higher share of both currencies than
the previous generation, then country h runs a trade surplus by equation (28). The
other case can be worked out in a similar way.
The end-of-the-period wealth of the young is equal to their total money holdings, as the
two currencies are the means by which they save and therefore finance future consumption.
Therefore, Proposition 1 suggests that the distribution of world wealth at the end of a
period is strongly related to the distribution of world GDP27. If the distribution of world
26World GDP is defined as the sum of countries’ nominal GDP expressed in units of the nume´raire currency.
27Because nominal interest rates are zero, then domestic GDP is equal to domestic income. Therefore, the distribution
of world GDP is also equal to the distribution of world income.
20
GDP changes across states of nature, then portfolio rebalancing occurs over time and the
distribution of wealth will change too.
Proposition 1 sheds further light on the behavior of the trade balance. If a country
is in surplus, it is because the young are relatively wealthier with respect to the past
and hence accumulate more assets, although this does not rule out the possibility that a
country is poorer than the other country in all states of nature28. Therefore, our model
offers a novel explanation of the fact that emerging countries run trade surpluses against
the United States: global imbalances simply reflect the rise of emerging countries in the
world economy, as Figure 4 suggests.
Since the share of world GDP is calculated in nominal terms, a change in a country’s
share of world GDP can be attributed partly to changes in output and partly to changes
in prices. Our numerical results will show that output changes dominate the terms of
trade effect as long as the elasticity of substitution between traded goods is greater than
1, which is supported by empirical evidence. Therefore, the reason behind the Chinese
surplus is that China’s real GDP has grown more than in the US. This has implied that
the distribution of world GDP has changed in favour of China over the past 20 years, as
Figure 4 suggests. The model shows that this is at the heart of the US-China imbalances.
Table 1 shows that the usefulness of our mechanism is not limited to capturing the
dynamics of the trade balance between the United States and East Asian countries.
We test the hypothesis suggested by Proposition 1, i.e. that the trade balance is
positively correlated with changes in the share of world GDP, estimating the following
fixed-effects model:
current account balancei,t = αi + β1 ·∆share of the world GDPi,t + β2 · country sizei,t + εi,t
where
∆share of the world GDPi,t = share of the world GDPi,t − share of the world GDPi,t−1
We use the current share of the world GDP as a proxy for country size. Our results
show that this relationship holds and is statistically significant for a large cross-section
of countries. In columns (3) and (4), we perform a couple of robustness checkes. Firstly,
we remove developing countries from the sample. The reason is that there is a large
28On the other hand, the poor country is always in trade deficit in cash-in-advance models under isoelastic utility (see
Eugeni (2013) for a derivation). The reason is that the sign of the trade balance only depend on the current shock, and not
on the past.
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Table 1: Panel regression of the current account balance, 1981-2011.
(1) (2) (3) Ex. developing (4) Ex. China and US
∆ share of world GDP 101.0027*** 57.3803*** 58.937*** 10.0902***
(6.6998) (6.9661) (11.3750) (4.6484)
Country size 22.8006*** 22.8603*** -20.1991***
(1.30894) (2.1037) (0.9534)
Constant 0.16445 -13.5959*** -32.7898*** 10.3064***
(0.3322) (0.85319) (3.1572) (0.4612)
R2 0.0956 0.1045 0.1185 0.0752
No. countries 183 183 69 181
No. observations 5,038 5,038 1,951 4,992
Source. IMF World Economic Outlook database. The main dependent variable is calculated using “Gross
domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) share of world total”. Data are until 2011 as
shares of world GDP are estimates after that date for many countries. Notes. The standard errors are
reported in parenthesis. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10%
level. All regressions are estimated with fixed effects.
cluster of observations for which the change in the share of world GDP is zero, and this is
typically the case for many developing countries. It can be observed that the regression
results are not significantly affected. Secondly, we remove instead the United States and
China since these two countries run the largest trade imbalances in the sample. While
the estimated coefficient is significantly smaller, the qualitative prediction as well as the
statistical significance are not challenged.
Finally, we conclude this section by commenting how agents allocate savings across
the two currencies in the model. According to Proposition 1, agents do not have very
sophisticated portfolio strategies as they hold the same share of both money stocks. One
reason is that we have assumed away “home bias” in the preferences, therefore agents hold
the two currencies in the same share as they like the two goods equally. We relax this
assumption in the numerical exercises below. The second reason is the “shock absorbing”
role that the nominal exchange rate plays in this model.
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Plugging the demand for the two currencies into the equilibrium conditions for the
money market, we get the following two equations:
M1 =
1
2
βσ
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p1(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ
A(s)
∑
h
wh(s) (38)
e(s)M2 =
1
2
βσe(s)1−σ
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p2(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ
A(s)
∑
h
wh(s) (39)
Combining equations (38) and (39), we obtain the following expression for the exchange
rate:
e(s) =
(
M1
M2
) 1
σ
∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p2(s′)
1−σ
σ∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p1(s′)
1−σ
σ
s = 1, ..., S (40)
Although the above expression is not a closed-form solution, we can gain some intuition
about the role of the nominal exchange rate and the importance of general equilibrium
analysis as opposed to partial equilibrium analysis. Recall the equation that linked the
portfolio choice of the agents to the nominal exchange rate (equation (27)). In a partial
equilibrium setting, an expected increase in the price of good 1 means that the purchasing
power of currency 1 will be lower in the future, therefore the relative demand for currency
1 falls (provided that the elasticity of substitution is bigger than 1). In equilibrium, the
nominal exchange rate will behave in such a way to counteract expectations on price
movements. In fact, equation (40) shows that currency 1 would depreciate to compensate
the effect on the demand for currency 1 of its fall of purchasing power. As a consequence,
agents choose the currencies in equal shares in equilibrium in the absence of home bias
(Proposition 1). In the context of the numerical exercises, we will explain in more detail
how output shocks generates nominal exchange rate fluctuations through fluctuations of
nominal prices.
4 The deterioration of the United States’ external position against
China: the role of valuation effects
The aim of this section is to show that our two-country model is able to explain the
dynamics of the net external position of the United States and China over the past
twenty years as the consequence of China’s increase in the share of world GDP, which
is due to China’s higher GDP growth. The intention is not to provide a fully-fledged
calibration exercise, as the model is stylized in many aspects. The purpose is rather to
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demonstrate that the model can offer an interpretation of the stylized facts presented
in the introduction, as well as a clean mechanism that indicates why and how exchange
rate-driven valuation effects contribute to the dynamics of the net external position of a
country.
The reasons why we choose the United States and China for our numerical exercise
are several. Firstly, China is widely known as one of the main creditors of the US and
the US deficit against China account for a significant fraction of the overall US current
account deficit (e.g. Eugeni, 2015). Second, the US has lost a considerable share of world
GDP in favour China (Figure 4). Moreover, the US-China imbalances are persistent
and our two-period OLG model is especially suitable to capture low-frequency trends in
international financial markets. The currency composition of the US and China’s balance
sheet can also be captured by our model, as their foreign assets are mainly denominated
in foreign currencies while foreign liabilities are mainly denominated in the domestic
currency. According to the Benetrix et al. (2015) database, 64% of US foreign assets were
denominated in foreign currencies while 88% of US foreign liabilities were denominated
in dollars in 201029. As far as China is concerned, 100% of the Chinese foreign assets
are denominated in foreign currency, 61% of which are dollar denominated. On the other
hand, 76% of Chinese liabilities were issued in renmimbi in 2010. This reflects a general
trend which sees emerging market economies increasingly able to borrow in their domestic
currency (Lane and Shambaugh, 2010)30.
Since agents live for two periods in our OLG economy, we assume that a period is
20-years long. As we wish to explain the deterioration of the US external position against
China over the past 20 years, we adopt the following strategy. We consider an economy
with two states of nature, where state 1 corresponds to the state of the world economy in
1990 while state 2 is the state of the world economy in 2010. Therefore, we will focus on
what happens in the world economy in the transition from state 1 to state 231.
We report the parameter values that we choose for the numerical exercise in Table 2.
29The first figure reflects the fact that many developing economies still borrow in US dollars as they are unable to issue
debt in domestic currency-denominated assets.
30Another signal of the increased ability of emerging countries to borrow in their own currency is that a third of the
foreign currency-denominated US foreign assets are denominated in currencies other than the Euro, the Yen, the Pound
and the Swiss Franc. Therefore, these are assets held in emerging economies and denominated in local currencies.
31This is not to argue that the world economy can only be in a state that matches the situation of the world economy
either of the 1990 or the 2010. However, a two-states example is enough to illustrate our arguments while adding more
states of nature would not provide neither more information nor intuition.
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We take the real GDP per capita of the United States and China in 1990 and 2010 to
parametrize output in the two states32. Notice that while US output has grown by 32%
over the 20-years period, China has grown by 384%. Although China has experienced
higher growth over time, real GDP per capita is still much lower than the US.
We normalize both money supplies to 1 since the level of the money supply does not
affect the real allocation33.
Since the model is not aimed at explaining high-frequency data, our value for the
elasticity of substitution between traded goods is more in line with the empirical work
based on low-frequency data, which found values in the range between 4 and 15 (see Ruhl,
2008). In the next section, we will show that our results are robust to different parameter
values for the elasticity of substitution as long as σ is greater than 1. Notice that this
rules out episodes of “immiserizing growth”. In fact, when 0 < σ < 1, a country that
experiences a positive output shock (everything else equal) is poorer in nominal terms
since the terms of trade effect dominates changes in output34.
The discount factor is set equal to 1 and identical across countries (we consider a more
standard value in the sensitivity analysis). We assume that the probability that output
tomorrow is the same as today is 0.9, which implies that output is somewhat persistent.
1 − ρ(ss) can also be interpreted as the probability that China catches up with the US
32We take output-side real GDP at chained PPPs and population data from the Penn World Tables 8.0.
33It can be checked that e.g. changing the money supply of country 1 by a fraction λ will increase p1 and e by exactly
the same fraction with no effects on consumption allocations and the various components of the balance of payments once
normalized as percentages of GDP.
34See e.g. Cole and Obstfeld (1991).
Table 2: Parameter Values. Baseline model.
US real GDP in 1990 y1(1) = 31, 432
US real GDP in 2010 y1(2) = 41, 627
Chinese real GDP in 1990 y2(1) = 2, 005
Chinese real GDP in 2010 y2(2) = 7, 693
Money supply M1 = M2 = 1
Elasticity of substitution σ1 = σ2 = 4
Share of home goods a11 = a
2
2 = 0.72
Discount factor β1 = β2 = 1
Output persistence ρ(ss) = 0.9
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as of 199035. Although assuming that the persistence parameter is 0.9 is standard in the
real business cycle literature, this might be questionable in a long-run model such as this
one. Hence, we will conduct various robustness exercises on this parameter. Finally, we
set the share of home goods in consumption as equal to 0.72 as in Corsetti et al. (2008).
In the next section, we will also study a more general version where the elasticity of
intratemporal substitution (between traded goods) is allowed to differ from the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution: while the model loses analytical tractability, the qualitative
as well as the quantitative results are not significantly affected.
4.1 The stabilizing role of valuation effects
We explain the solution method and report the equilibrium prices, as well as a calculation
of the terms of trade, in Appendix B.
Country 1 (the US) experiences an improvement of the terms of trade in the transition
from state 1 to state 2, as the price of imports falls relatively to the price of exports. This
is due to a supply effect, as output in country 2 (China) has increased relatively more
than output in country 1. At the same time, currency 1 depreciates (see the Appendix).
The main intuition behind the depreciation of the dollar can be explained as follows.
While both nominal prices fall in the transition from state 1 to state 2, as supply increases
in both countries, the Chinese good becomes relatively cheaper due to China’s higher
output growth. Hence, the Chinese currency has a higher rate of return. Because the
current generation expects that the current state realizes tomorrow with a high probability,
this generates a higher demand for the Chinese currency. Hence, currency 2 (yuan) has
to appreciate in equilibrium.
In Table 3, we report the share of world GDP and the money holdings of the two
countries in the two states of nature.
Since China’s real GDP growth rate is higher than the US, its share of world GDP
increases and therefore the young born in 2010 accumulate more assets than the previous
generation. Despite the catching-up, China is still poorer than the US and holds a lower
share of both the domestic and the foreign currency. If there was no home bias, the
share of the assets held by each country would simply be equal to its share of world GDP
according to Proposition 1. Since we have now allowed for the possibility of home bias,
35We thank Michael Reiter for this nice interpretation.
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this equivalence does not hold precisely. The consequence of home bias in consumption
is that each country is holding more domestic than foreign assets in any given period.
Figure 5: The US share of “World GDP”, 1990-2010
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Note. World GDP is calculated using gross domestic product per capita based on PPP per capita GDP at current international dollar. IMF data.
The model predicts a drop of the US share of world GDP by around 10%, and this is
consistent with the US data as shown by Figure 5. Since this is a two-country model, the
share of world GDP is simply the ratio of the US gross domestic product divided by the
sum of the GDPs of China and the US36.
36In this model, we do not consider the potential impact of differential population growth rates on GDP and we look at
GDP per capita for both countries, where GDP growth only comes from an increase in real GDP. This is not a restrictive
assumption in this framework, as the average growth rate of the working population in the US and China is quite similar
over the twenty-years period (e.g. see Eugeni, 2015).
Table 3: The share of “world GDP” and currency holdings. Baseline model.
1990 2010
US Share of “world GDP” w1(1)∑
h wh(1)
= 0.8966 w1(2)∑
h wh(2)
= 0.8
Share of domestic currency held
m11(1)
M1 = 0.9249
m11(2)
M1 = 0.8727
Share of foreign currency held
m21(1)
M2 = 0.6508
m21(2)
M2 = 0.5091
China Share of “world GDP” w2(1)∑
h wh(1)
= 0.1034 w2(2)∑
h wh(2)
= 0.2
Share of domestic currency held
m22(1)
M2 = 0.3492
m22(2)
M2 = 0.4909
Share of foreign currency held
m12(1)
M1 = 0.0751
m12(2)
M1 = 0.1273
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Using equations (28) and (32), we can compute the balance of trade, the change in
the net foreign assets position and valuation effects for the US. The key identity that
pins down the various components of the net external position of China can be derived
following the same steps as for country 1. We report our variables as percentages of the
respective country’s GDP in Table 4.
Table 4: The net external positions of the US and China, 2010. Baseline model.
Trade balance % GDP Valuation effects % GDP Change in NFA % GDP
US tb1(12) = −4.1073 val1(12) = 2.9559 ∆nfa1(12) = −1.1514
China tb2(12) = 16.4316 val2(12) = −11.8252 ∆nfa2(12) = 4.6063
Table 5: The net external positions of the US and China, 1990-2010. Data.
∑2010
t=1990 CAt
GDP2010
%
∑2010
t=1990 V ALt
GDP2010
% NFA2010−NFA1990GDP2010 %
United States −41% 26% −15%
China 31% −6% 25%
United States vs. China −15%
Notes. The change in the net foreign assets position is calculated using the database of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007). The current account of the US as well as the US position against China is calculated using data from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis although the second time-series only starts from 1999. Valuation effects are
computed as the difference between the change in the net foreign assets’ position and the current account.
As the US experience lower growth, they run a (cumulated) trade deficit of more than
4% of domestic GDP. The asset side explanation is that, as the Chinese become wealthier,
they accumulate more domestic and foreign assets. Hence, the US accumulate less foreign
assets and hold more foreign liabilities and their net foreign assets position worsens. In an
overlapping-generations model, the trade balance is backward-looking as well as forward-
looking since the aggregate consumption of the country is composed of the consumption
of the old as well as the young. Therefore, the country that runs a surplus is not the
richest country in the current state, but the country whose relative position in the world
economy has improved over time. In the goods’ markets, the US import more and export
less than before since Chinese goods become relatively cheaper37.
The trade deficit is partially offset by substantial positive valuation effects. As the
37Plugging the budget constraints into (28), we can write the other definition of the balance of trade as the difference
between exports and imports: tb1(s′s) ≡ p1(s)[c112(s) + c122(s′s)]− p2(s)e(s)[c211(s) + c221(s′s)]
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Chinese currency appreciates, the value of the US foreign assets increases relatively to
the value of foreign liabilities. Therefore, the US experience a positive wealth effect that
mitigates the negative impact of the trade deficit on the external position of the country.
On the other hand, China experiences a negative wealth effect as the country runs a trade
surplus.
To compare our results with the data, we calculate the change in the net foreign assets
positions, the current account and valuation effects of the US and China as accumulated
over the past 20 years as a percentage of GDP in 2010.
First of all, Table 5 shows that the US current account deficit against China is one of the
main driving forces behind the US current account deficit. Our model can explain almost
a third of the US-China current account imbalance (4% out of 15%). Moreover, the model
can capture the fact that valuation effects have stabilized both the net external positions
of China and the United States. While the Bureau of Economic Analysis provides the
current account position of the US disaggregated by country, we do not possess data on
the US net foreign assets position versus China. As a consequence, we cannot compute
the valuation effects between the US and China as a residual and make a full comparison
between the model and the data. Yet, our result that valuation effects substantially
contribute to the dynamics of the net foreign assets positions of the two countries is
consistent with the overall data for the US and China.
The attentive reader will have noticed that the model overestimates the Chinese valu-
ation effects with respect to the data. The reason is that we make the assumption that
the Chinese exchange rate regime is freely floating, while the bulk of the Chinese currency
appreciation happened after the reforms that took place in the mid-2000s. It is impor-
tant to stress that our model can only capture low-frequency movements of the exchange
rate and the balance of trade and does not aim at explaining high-frequency movements
(or lack of) in foreign exchange markets. The model predicts that country 2’s currency
appreciates by 61% while the renmbimbi has only appreciated by 25% with respect to the
dollar over the period 1994-201038. This indicates that the wealth transfer from China to
the US would have been much bigger if the Chinese had a fully floating nominal exchange
rate regime.
The result that exchange rate-driven valuation effects are stabilizing is consistent with
the empirical literature, which has found that the correlation between the trade balance
38We use the end-of-the-period exchange rate time-series provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
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and valuation effects is negative (see e.g. Lane et al., 2002), and with the findings of
other theoretical papers, which have shown that asset price-driven valuation effects are
also stabilizing (e.g. Pavlova et al., 2010; Devereux et al., 2010). As Gourinchas et al.
(2007) and Lane et al. (2010) have shown, exchange rate-driven valuation effects are also
empirically relevant and this paper shows that one possible mechanism behind them is
differences in output growth rates across countries. In particular, our mechanism provides
an explanation behind the stylized facts presented in Figures 1-4, which show that the US
have experienced positive valuation effects over the past 20 years despite accumulating
a substantial trade deficit, while many emerging economies have experienced exactly the
reverse, as a result of the increase in the share of world GDP of emerging countries (and
especially China).
4.2 The importance of the valuation channel in the dynamics of net foreign
assets
The other relevant contribution of this paper is that the model can generate meaningful
expected valuation effects, which substantially contribute to the dynamics of net foreign
assets.
Following the analysis in section 2.4, we can derive a forward-looking expression for
the net foreign assets position of the US in 1990.
NFA1(1) = E1s′NFA1(s
′)− E1s′TB1(1s′)− E1s′V AL1(1s′) (41)
where E1s′ is the expectation operator which is conditional on the fact that the world
economy is in state 1 in 1990.
Using our definitions (32), (33) and (35), the expected valuation effects can be calcu-
lated as follows:
E1s′V AL1(1s
′) ≡ FA1(1)E1s′r(1s′) =
= FA1(1)[ρ(11)r(11) + ρ(12)r(12)] = ρ(12)V AL1(12) (42)
since r(11) = 0. Equation (42) shows that as long as the nominal exchange rate fluctuates
across the two states of nature (r(12) 6= 0), then expected valuation effects are different
from zero.
Applying equation (36), we can calculate the unexpected component of valuation effects
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as follows:
UNV AL1(12) = V AL1(12)− ρ(12)V AL1(12) = ρ(11)V AL1(12) (43)
Since we have set ρ(ss) = 0.9, 90% of the observed valuation effects for the US between
1990 and 2010 are unexpected and the remaining 10% expected. Hence, equation (43)
seems to indicate that that the higher is the persistence of output the bigger is the
unexpected component of valuation effects. Nonetheless, we will show in the sensitivity
analysis that the importance of the expected valuation component in the dynamics of
external adjustment actually increases with ρ(ss) as the realized valuation effects are
relatively larger.
Table 6 reports the percentage of the net foreign assets position explained by each
component in (41).
Table 6: A decomposition of the net external positions of the US in 1990
E1s′NFA1(s
′)
NFA1(1)
% − E1s′TB1(1s′)NFA1(1) % −
E1s′V AL1(1s
′)
NFA1(1)
%
82.05 − −64.03 − 46.08
The table shows that all three components have been important in driving the adjust-
ment of the net external position of the US. Since growth was expected to be higher in
China, then the model predicts that we should have expected a process of adjustment of
the net external position of the US driven by a deterioration of the net foreign assets’
position due to a trade deficit as well as positive valuation effects.
As NFA1(1) > 0, the net external position remains (changes to) positive (negative)
with higher (lower) probability as output is persistent. A great percentage of NFA is
explained by the expected NFA position, which is of the same sign as the actual position.
However, agents expect that the NFA will be lower than the current NFA as they expect
a trade deficit. If the same state realizes next period, then the trade balance will be zero
(equation (28)) and agents would regard this as the most likely outcome. However, there
is a positive probability in 1990 that the distribution of wealth would shift in favor of
China leading to a trade deficit, hence agents would expect a trade deficit overall. As the
expected trade balance component has a negative sign, then the expected stock and flow
components of net foreign assets would more than explain the current NFA position. But
finally, and most importantly, agents would expect an exchange rate depreciation due to
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the higher growth in China, hence the positive expected valuation effects.
Table 6 shows that a fundamental part of the process of the external adjustment
between 1990 and 2010 can be explained by expected valuation effects. The literature on
valuation effects to date has been been able to generate large unexpected valuation effects
(see e.g. Nguyen, 2011), but the dynamics of net foreign assets is still driven by the trade
balance channel as shown by Tille et al. (2010), Devereux et al. (2010) and Ghironi et
al. (2015).
Suppose that we wanted to use our framework to predict the process of adjustment
of the present net foreign assets position of the US. In this case, the signs of the various
components would be exactly the opposite39:
NFA1(2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
= E2s′NFA1(s
′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
−E2s′TB1(2s′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
−E2s′V AL1(2s′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
(44)
In particular, we should expect that the net foreign assets position improves thanks
to a trade surplus and but we should also expect negative valuation effects for the US.
This might seem in contradiction with Gourinchas et al. (2007), who find that future
trade surpluses for the US should be accompanied by positive valuation effects instead.
As we explained in section 2.4, our equation is more general than Gourinchas et al.
(2007) since they assume that the no-Ponzi game condition holds, which implies that
E2s′NFA1(s
′) = 0. Hence, we cannot expect to fully relate our results with their empirical
analysis. It is easy to see that the restriction that E2s′NFA1(s
′) = 0 automatically implies
that E2s′V AL1(2s
′) > 0 when E2s′TB1(2s′) > 0, but that is not necessarily the case when
E2s′NFA1(s
′) 6= 0. Yet, our framework supports their empirical finding that expected
valuation effects are a fundamental component of the process of external adjustment by
suggesting a mechanism based on expected growth differentials across countries.
5 Sensitivity analysis
The aim of this section is to check the robustness of the baseline model to alternative
specifications of σ and ρ(ss). Finally, we also allow for the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution to differ from the intratemporal elasticity of substitution. While the model
loses analytical tractability, our results are not affected by introducing a more general
specification.
39This only holds under the assumption that the US are expected to grow more than China in the future.
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5.1 The elasticity of substitution
Table 7 shows that valuation effects always act as a stabilizer of the net external positions
of the two countries, independently from the chosen value of the elasticity of substitution.
As we explained in the previous section, the most realistic values for the elasticity is
between 4 and 15 considering that we deal with low-frequency data (see Ruhl (2010)).
We do not show the results for 0 < σ < 1, as this would corresponds to a situation of
immiserizing growth. For completeness, we also report the case in which σ = 1, which
corresponds to the log case whose analytical solution we derive in Appendix B.
As the elasticity of substitution increases, goods are increasingly substitutable and
agents do not react as much to changes in prices in their demand for the currencies.
Therefore, the nominal exchange rate has less of a “shock-absorbing” role and valuation
effects become less important relatively to the trade imbalances. As a consequence, the
change in the net foreign asset positions of the two countries increases with the elasticity.
However, valuation effects still account for a significant proportion of the dynamics of net
foreign assets.
Table 7: Varying the elasticity of substitution
Trade balance % GDP Val. effects % GDP ∆NFA % GDP
United States
σ = 1 0 0 0
σ = 2 −4.0856 3.4385 −0.6471
σ = 4 −4.1073 2.9559 −1.1514
σ = 8 −3.8822 2.1888 −1.6933
σ = 10 −3.8046 1.9322 −1.8724
σ = 16 −3.6449 1.4110 −2.2339
China
σ = 1 0 0 0
σ = 2 11.2413 −9.4607 1.7806
σ = 4 16.4316 −11.8252 4.6063
σ = 8 18.2916 −10.3132 7.9784
σ = 10 18.4841 −9.3874 9.0967
σ = 16 18.5050 −7.1336 11.3415
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5.2 The relationship between the persistence of output and valuation effects
Table 8 shows that, for valuation effects to stabilize the net external positions of a country,
the probability that next period’s state is the same as the current period’s must be
sufficiently high. Valuation effects are stabilizing as long as ρ(ss) ≥ 0.5 but move in
the same direction as the country’s trade balance when ρ(ss) = 0.440. Therefore, there
is some cut-off value of ρ(ss) between 0.4 and 0.5 below which valuation effects are no
longer stabilizing.
When there is no home bias (a1h = a
2
h), it is easy to see that this cut-off value is exactly
0.5. When ρ(ss) = 0.5, agents born in different states attach the same probabilities to
future states, which implies that the exchange rate is constant in a stationary equilibrium
hence valuation effects are zero (see equations (40) and (32)). When there is home bias,
this cut-off value is smaller therefore valuation effects are stabilizing for a larger set of
values of ρ(ss). The condition under which valuation effects are stabilizing is not very
stringent, as it only requires that output is somewhat persistent in the two countries.
Table 8 also indicates that valuation effects contribute more to the change in net foreign
40In this case, state 1 is more likely to occur when state 2 is realized hence agents would expect more inflation in country
2. This would lead to more demand for currency 1, hence an appreciation and negative valuation effects for the US.
Table 8: Varying output persistence
Trade balance % GDP Val. effects % GDP ∆NFA % GDP
United States
ρ(ss) = 0.4 −2.9122 −0.0838 −2.9960
ρ(ss) = 0.5 −3.0204 0.1964 −2.8240
ρ(ss) = 0.6 −3.1670 0.5741 −2.5929
ρ(ss) = 0.7 −3.3715 1.0969 −2.2747
ρ(ss) = 0.8 −3.6663 1.8430 −1.8232
ρ(ss) = 0.9 −4.1073 2.9559 −1.1514
China
ρ(ss) = 0.4 12.1836 0.3508 12.5344
ρ(ss) = 0.5 12.5771 −0.8178 11.7593
ρ(ss) = 0.6 13.1065 −2.3757 10.7308
ρ(ss) = 0.7 13.8393 −4.5024 9.3370
ρ(ss) = 0.8 14.8850 −7.4827 7.4022
ρ(ss) = 0.9 16.4316 −11.8252 4.6063
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assets the higher is the persistence of output. The reason is that the exchange rate is
more volatile, as the expectations of individuals born in different states of nature vary
more widely.
In Table 9, we explore how the various components of adjustment in the dynamics of
the net external position of the US vary with ρ(ss).
Table 9: A decomposition of the net external positions of the US in 1990 for different values of ρ(ss)
E1s′NFA1(s
′)
NFA1(1)
% − E1s′TB1(1s′)NFA1(1) % −
E1s′V AL1(1s
′)
NFA1(1)
%
ρ(ss) = 0.5 −24.44 − −133.099 − 8.65
ρ(ss) = 0.6 5.70 − −115.18 − 20.88
ρ(ss) = 0.7 33.96 − −97.89 − 31.85
ρ(ss) = 0.8 59.69 − −81.06 − 40.75
ρ(ss) = 0.9 82.05 − −64.03 − 46.08
As ρ(ss) increases, the valuation channel becomes increasingly important in explaining
the process of adjustment of net foreign assets’ position. Although the expected compo-
nent is relatively smaller than the unexpected component (equations (42) and (43)), the
realized valuation effects are quantitatively larger (Table 8) hence they can explain a
significant percentage of the net external position.
To conclude, we have shown that the relative importance of the valuation channel as
opposed to the trade balance channel crucially depends on the nature of the stochastic
process of output: when there is high persistence in the economy, the nominal exchange
rate is more volatile and the valuation component becomes a crucial adjustment mecha-
nism.
5.3 Separating the intertemporal and the intratemporal elasticities of sub-
stitution
In this section, we relax Assumption 1 to take into account that the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution is typically much lower than the elasticity of substitution between
traded goods. While the baseline model was partially tractable, this generalized version
is not and finding its solution involves the numerical computation of a large system of
nonlinear equations, which includes the first-order conditions of the agents, the budget
constraints as well as the market clearing equations. Even in our simple two-states exam-
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ple, the equilibrium system is quite large as it consists of 22 equations and unknowns41.
We show in detail how to solve this generalized version of the model in Appendix C.
For our sensitivity analysis, we choose the same coefficient of risk aversion as Corsetti et
al. (2008)42. In this section, we consider a value for the discount factor which is standard
in the real business cycle literature. Since we assume that a period lasts 20 years, then
a quarterly discount rate of 0.99 implies that β = 0.9920×4 = 0.45 (see also De La Croix
and Doepke, 2003; Gottardi and Kubler, 2011). The other parameters are the same as in
the baseline model.
Table 10: Parameter Values. Generalized model.
Coefficient of risk aversion γ1 = γ2 = 2
Discount factor β1 = β2 = 0.45
As the following table shows, the quantitative results of this more general version of
the model is not very different from the baseline.
Table 11: The net external positions of the US and China, 2010. A more general model.
Trade balance % GDP Valuation effects % GDP Change in NFA % GDP
US tb1(12) = −4.2796 val1(12) = 2.4244 ∆nfa1(12) = −1.8552
China tb2(12) = 17.3641 val2(12) = −9.8367 ∆nfa2(12) = 7.5274
6 Conclusions
This paper presents a two-country model of nominal exchange rate determination where
exchange rate-driven valuation effects substantially contribute to the dynamics of the net
foreign assets’ position of a country. If real output growth rates differ across countries, the
distribution of world GDP varies over time and trade imbalances among the two countries
arise. In particular, a country runs a trade surplus if its relative position in the world
economy improves, as measured by the share of world GDP. As the current generation is
wealthier than the previous one, it holds a higher share of the available assets in the world
economy and therefore the country’s net foreign assets increase. We provide evidence to
41A higher number of countries or states of nature would substantially increase the dimension of the system.
42In Appendix C, we show that our results are not particularly sensitive to the degree of risk aversion.
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show that the mechanism which generates trade imbalances in the model is empirically
relevant. The nominal exchange rate fluctuates according to agents’ expectations about
the relative purchasing power of the two currencies: if a currency is expected to have a
higher purchasing power in the future (because of higher output growth in the home coun-
try), then an increase in demand for that currency causes an exchange rate appreciation.
Exchange rate fluctuations generate quantitatively big valuation effects for reasonable pa-
rameter values, which stabilize the countries’ net foreign assets positions. Our model is
consistent with the stylized facts on the net external positions that the United States and
East Asian countries have built up over the past twenty years and the depreciation of the
dollar against the currencies of emerging market economies. This model also shows that
expected valuation effects are an important part of the process of external adjustment of
a country, as the empirical literature has emphasized (see Gourinchas et al., 2007).
One of the main challenges ahead is to design a model that can simultaneously explain
exchange rate and asset price-driven valuation effects. This would be important in order
to understand whether or under which conditions these two sources of valuation effects
behave differently from a qualitative point of view, as well as their relative importance
from a quantitative point of view. Another important issue which we leave to future
research is the investigation of the role of monetary policy in a world where exchange
rate fluctuations affect the net external positions of many countries. Do central banks
amplify valuation effects while pursuing their monetary policies? But even more impor-
tantly, should central banks be worried about these huge wealth effects or is exchange
rate volatility harmless instead? These are very open questions and beyond the scope
of this paper. Our framework can explain some relevant trends in international financial
markets and it is a promising line of research in the direction of answering other important
research questions.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A
7.1.1 The (in)determinacy of the nominal exchange rate and portfolios
In this section, we clarify why the requirement that agents must choose their portfolio of
currencies before uncertainty is realized (without being able to readjust their decision) is
crucial to guarantee exchange rate and portfolio determinacy.
Let us now assume that agents can adjust their portfolio decision once the value of the
shock is known. The budget constraints of the old would be written as follows:
m1h(ss
′) + e(s′)m2h(ss
′) = m1h(s) + e(s
′)m2h(s)
p1(s′)c12h(ss
′) = m1h(ss
′)
p2(s′)c22h(ss
′) = m2h(ss
′)
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The main implication is that the old would be allowed to trade the currencies in the for-
eign exchange markets before the goods’ markets open. After they adjust their portfolios,
they would spend their currencies in the respective markets according to their cash-in-
advance constraints. However, the above constraints can be consolidated as follows:
p1(s′)c12h(ss
′) + p2(s′)e(s′)c22h(ss
′) = m1h(s) + e(s
′)m2h(s) (45)
Under this structure, our economy would be practically identical to Manuelli et al.
(1990), where the nominal exchange rate and portfolios are indeterminate. In the deter-
ministic world of Kareken et al. (1981), the two currencies are perfect substitutes as stores
of value, hence a portfolio of currencies cannot be pinned down. The nominal exchange
rate is constant in equilibrium and its value cannot be determined. Manuelli et al. (1990)
find the same indeterminacy result in a stochastic OLG model. Although the nominal
exchange rate can fluctuate, the equilibrium path for the nominal exchange rate is still
indeterminate. The only difference between our framework and theirs is that ours is a
two-good economy while theirs is a one-good economy. However, the indeterminacy of
the nominal exchange rate is not solved by augmenting the number of goods.
7.1.2 Derivation of portfolios
In this section, we explain how to derive the demand for the currencies.
First, combine (15), (12) and (14) for ` = 1:
c11h(s)
− 1
σ
p1(s)
= β
∑
s′
ρ(ss′)c11h(ss
′)−
1
σ
p1(s′)
(46)
and rewrite it as follows:
p1(s)
1−σ
σ
[p1(s)c11h(s)]
1
σ
= β
∑
s′
ρ(ss′)p1(s′)
1−σ
σ
[p1(s′)c11h(ss′)]
1
σ
(47)
Plugging p1(s′)c12h(ss
′) = m1h(s) for every s
′, we can sum up the numerators in the right
hand side and elevate both sides of the equation to σ:
p1(s)
1−σ
p1(s)c11h(s)
= βσ
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p1(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ
m1h(s)
(48)
Next, we combine the first-order conditions for the goods consumed when young as follows:
a1h
1
σ c11h(s)
− 1
σ
p1(s)
=
a2h
1
σ c21h(s)
− 1
σ
p2(s)e(s)
(49)
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After some manipulations, the above equation can be rewritten as follows:
p2(s)e(s)c21h(s)
a2h
=
[p2(s)e(s)]1−σ
p1(s)1−σ
p1(s)c11h(s)
a1h
(50)
Now, plug (50) into the budget constraint when young and obtain:
p1(s)c11h(s) =
a1hp
1(s)1−σ
a1hp
1(s)1−σ + a2h[p2(s)e(s)]1−σ
[wh(s)−m1h(s)− e(s)m2h(s)] (51)
Plug it into (48) and rearrange:
m1h(s) =
a1hβ
σ
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p1(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ
[wh(s)− e(s)m2h(s)]
a1hp
1(s)1−σ + a2h[p2(s)e(s)]1−σ + a
1
hβ
σ
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p1(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ (52)
Now, combine (16) with (14) for ` = 2:
λh(s)e(s) = a
2
hβ
∑
s′
ρ(ss′)c22h(ss
′)−
1
σ
p2(s′)
(53)
Multiplying and dividing each term of the right hand side by p2(s′)
1
σ and then substituting
p2(s′)c22h(ss
′) = m2h(s), we can sum the numerators on the right hand side and get the
following equation:
λh(s) = a
2
hβ
∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p2(s′)
1−σ
σ
m2h(s)
1
σ e(s)
(54)
Because λh(s) =
∑
s′ λ
1
h(ss
′), we can write:
a1hβ
∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p1(s′)
1−σ
σ
m1h(s)
1
σ︸ ︷︷ ︸∑
s′ λ
1
h(ss
′)
= a2hβ
∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p2(s′)
1−σ
σ
m2h(s)
1
σ e(s)
(55)
or
m1h(s)
m2h(s)
= e(s)σ
a1h
a2h
e(s)σ
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p1(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p2(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ (56)
Solving (56) and (52) simultaneously, we obtain the demand for the two currencies:
m1h(s) =
a1hβ
σ
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p1(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ
Ah(s)
wh(s) (57)
m2h(s) =
a2hβ
σe(s)−σ
[∑
s′ ρ(ss
′)p2(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ
Ah(s)
wh(s) (58)
where
Ah(s) ≡ a1hp1(s)1−σ + a2h[p2(s)e(s)]1−σ + a1hβσ
[∑
s′
ρ(ss′)p1(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ
+
+ a2hβ
σe(s)1−σ
[∑
s′
ρ(ss′)p2(s′)
1−σ
σ
]σ
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7.1.3 Derivation of the demand functions of the young
Let us recall the budget constraint of agent h born in state s:
p1(s)c11h(s) + p
2(s)e(s)c21h(s) = wh(s)−m1h(s)− e(s)m2h(s)
Firstly, we can obtain total expenditure by substituting the demand for the currencies
(20) and (21):
p1(s)c11h(s) + p
2(s)e(s)c21h(s) =
a1hp
1(s)1−σ + a2h[p
2(s)e(s)]1−σ
Ah(s)
wh(s) (59)
Combining the above equation with (50), we can derive the demand functions of the young
agents.
7.2 Appendix B. Solution of the model
7.2.1 Methodology and numerical solution
First, the number of equations in the goods’ markets can be reduced by applying Walras
Law. Suppose that money markets clear. If we sum across agents the budget constraints
of the young and the old and combine them, we get the following equation:
p1(s)[c11(s) + c
1
2(s
′s)− y1(s)] + p2(s)e(s)[c21(s) + c22(s′s)− y2(s)] = 0 ∀ s′, s
For every pair of (s′, s), if the market for good 1 clears then the market for good 2 clears
automatically. Therefore, S2 equations can be made redundant.
Given Walras Law, suppose that the independent equations in the goods’ markets are
those for good 1. The next step is to sum across agents the budget constraints of the old
for good 1 in state s so that we obtain the following equation:
p1(s)c12(s
′s) = M1
It is easy to see that the aggregate consumption of the old does not depend on the previous
state (the state realized when born) as aggregate real money balances only depend on the
current state:
c12(s
′s) =
M1
p1(s)
⇒ c12(s′s) = c12(s)
Given that the aggregate consumption of the old for good 1 does not depend on the past,
it is enough that S equations in the market for good 1 clears. For instance, assume that
the independent equations are those for which s′ = s:
c11(s) + c
1
2(ss) = y
1(s)
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Therefore, the solution method involves to find the nominal prices and the exchange
rates which solve the following system of 3S equations:∑
h
c11h(s) +
∑
h
c12h(ss) = y
1(s)∑
h
m1h(s) = M
1
∑
h
m2h(s) = M
2
In section 4, we assume that S = 2 which implies that we have a system of 6 equa-
tions and unknowns to solve. After plugging the demand functions for goods and money
balances into the above market clearing equations, we solve the system numerically using
Matlab.
The solution under the parameter values chosen in section 4 is:
p1(1) = 6.1486× 10−5 p1(2) = 4.9539× 10−5
p2(1) = 8.1947× 10−4 p2(2) = 2.9220× 10−4
e(1) = 0.1357 e(2) = 0.2293
It is also useful to compute relative prices, expressed in the nume´raire currency, as
follows: p(s) ≡ p2(s)e(s)
p1(s)
. Therefore:
p(1) = 1.8079
p(2) = 1.3526
When p(s) falls, the price of US imports (exports) falls (increases). Therefore the US
experiences an improvement of the terms of trade in the transition from state 1 to state
2.
7.2.2 An analytically tractable version: log utility
In this section, we derive the baseline model assuming that σ → 1.
Agent h born in state s solves the following maximization problem:
max
∑
`
a`h log c
`
1h(s) + β
∑
s′
ρ(ss′)
∑
`
a`h log c
`
2h(ss
′)
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subject to (9), (10) and (11). The first-order conditions are:
c11h(s) :
a1h
c11h(s)
= λh(s)p
1(s) (60)
c21h(s) :
a2h
c21h(s)
= λh(s)p
2(s)e(s) (61)
c`2h(ss
′) :
βa`hρ(ss
′)
c`2h(ss
′)
= λ`h(ss
′)p`(s′) ∀ `, s′ (62)
m1h(s) : −λh(s) +
∑
s′
λ1h(ss
′) = 0 (63)
m2h(s) : −λh(s)e(s) +
∑
s′
λ2h(ss
′) = 0 (64)
λh(s) : p
1(s)[c11h(s)− ω1h(s)] + p2(s)e(s)[c21h(s)− ω2h(s)] +
+ m1h(s) + e(s)m
2
h(s) = 0 (65)
λ1h(ss
′) : p1(s′)c12h(ss
′)−m1h(s) = 0 ∀ s′ (66)
λ2h(ss
′) : p2(s′)c22h(ss
′)−m2h(s) = 0 ∀ s′ (67)
Solving the above maximization problem involves the following steps. First, combine
(60) and (61):
p1(s)c11h(s)
a1h
=
p2(s)e(s)c21h(s)
a2h
(68)
Plug the above into the young’s budget constraint to obtain:
p1(s)c11h(s) = a
1
h[wh(s)−m1h(s)− e(s)m2h(s)] (69)
Take the first-order conditions for good 1 in all spots and plug them into (63):
a1h
p1(s)c11h(s)
= βa1h
∑
s′
ρ(ss′)
p1(s′)c12h(ss′)
(70)
Then, substitute (69) and (66) into (70) and obtain:
m1h(s)
(
1 + a1hβ
)
= βa1h[wh(s)− e(s)m2h(s)] (71)
Now follow the same steps for good 2. First, take (68) and this time rewrite the budget
constraint when young getting rid of good 1. Second, combine (64), (61) and (62) for
good 2. Finally, plug in the rewritten budget constraint and (67):
e(s)m2h(s)
(
1 + a2hβ
)
= βa2h[wh(s)−m1h(s)] (72)
Solve equations (71) and (72) simultaneously to obtain agent h’s demand for the curren-
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cies:
m1h(s) =
βa1h
1 + β
wh(s)
m2h(s) =
βa2h
1 + β
wh(s)
e(s)
The demand functions are:
c11h(s) =
a1h
1 + β
wh(s)
p1(s)
c21h(s) =
a2h
1 + β
wh(s)
p2(s)e(s)
c12h(ss
′) =
βa1h
1 + β
wh(s)
p1(s′)
∀ s′
c22h(ss
′) =
βa2h
1 + β
wh(s)
p2(s′)e(s)
∀ s′
As in the more general case, demand is a linear functions of wealth. However, the demand
for the goods and the two currencies are not functions of future prices and this makes the
model analytically tractable.
In the main body of the paper, we have shown that only S equations in the goods’
markets are independent. For instance, we can take the market clearing equations for
good 1 when the previous state is equal to the current state:∑
h
c11h(s) +
∑
h
c12h(ss) = y
1(s)
Now, substitute the demand functions for good 1 into the market clearing equation:∑
h
a1h
1 + β
wh(s)
p1(s)
+
∑
h
βa1h
1 + β
wh(s)
p1(s)
= y1(s)
Using the fact that w1(s) = p
1(s)y1(s) and w2(s) = p
2(s)e(s)y2(s), the market clearing
equation for good 1 pins down relative prices or the terms of trade in each state:
p2(s)e(s)
p1(s)
=
a21y
1(s)
a12y
2(s)
s = 1, ..., S (73)
Using (73), we can show that the money market clearing equations pin down nominal
prices:
p1(s) =
M1
y1(s)
1 + β
β
s = 1, ..., S (74)
p2(s) =
M2
y2(s)
1 + β
β
s = 1, ..., S (75)
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Finally, the exchange rate can be computed:
e(s) = e =
M1
M2
a21
a12
(76)
Under log utility, it is remarkable that the exchange rate is constant even though the
stochastic process is Markov and discount factors differ across agents.
Equations (74), (75) and (76) reveal that agents born in different states of nature have
the same wealth. Therefore, it is immediate that the demand for the currencies are not
state dependent:
m`h(s) = m
`
h ∀ h, `
As there is no portfolio rebalancing across states of nature, the balance of trade is always
in equilibrium and the change in net foreign assets is equal to zero in all states (see section
4).
Finally, we can compute the consumption allocation:
c111(s) =
a11
1+β
y1(s) c112(s) =
a21
1+β
y1(s)
c211(s) =
a12
1+β
y2(s) c212(s) =
a22
1+β
y2(s)
c121(s
′s) = βa
1
1
1+β
y1(s) c122(s
′s) = βa
2
1
1+β
y1(s)
c221(s
′s) = βa
1
2
1+β
y2(s) c122(s
′s) = βa
2
2
1+β
y2(s)
Note that since portfolio rebalancing does not occur, then the consumption of the old
does not depend on the state of birth but simply on the state realized when old.
7.3 Appendix C. Separating the intertemporal and the intratemporal elas-
ticities of substitution
To solve the agents’ maximization problem, it is convenient to plug the budget constraints
of the old (10) and (11) into the CES aggregators of the old (3) as follows:
c2h(ss
′) ≡
[
a1h
1
σ
(
m1h(s)
p1(s′)
)σ−1
σ
+ a2h
1
σ
(
m2h(s)
p2(s′)
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
(77)
Therefore, our problem becomes to choose a portfolio of currencies mh(s) and a con-
sumption vector when young c1h(s) which maximizes (1) subject to the CES aggregator
of the young (2), the modified CES aggregator of the old (77) and the budget constraint
of the young (9).
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The first-order conditions are:
c11h(s) : a
1
h
1
σ c11h(s)
− 1
σ
[
a1h
1
σ c11h(s)
σ−1
σ + a2h
1
σ c21h(s)
σ−1
σ
] 1−γσ
σ−1
= λh(s)p
1(s)
c21h(s) : a
2
h
1
σ c21h(s)
− 1
σ
[
a1h
1
σ c11h(s)
σ−1
σ + a2h
1
σ c21h(s)
σ−1
σ
] 1−γσ
σ−1
= λh(s)p
2(s)e(s)
m1h(s) : βa
1
h
1
σ
∑
s′
(
m1h(s)
p1(s′)
)− 1
σ
[
a1h
1
σ
(
m1h(s)
p1(s′)
)σ−1
σ
+ a2h
1
σ
(
m2h(s)
p2(s′)
)σ−1
σ
] 1−γσ
σ−1
= λh(s)p
1(s′)
m2h(s) : βa
2
h
1
σ
∑
s′
(
m2h(s)
p2(s′)
)− 1
σ
[
a1h
1
σ
(
m1h(s)
p1(s′)
)σ−1
σ
+ a2h
1
σ
(
m2h(s)
p2(s′)
)σ−1
σ
] 1−γσ
σ−1
= λh(s)p
2(s′)e(s)
λh(s) : wh(s)−m1h(s)− e(s)m2h(s)− p1(s)c11h(s)− p2(s)e(s)c21h(s) = 0
We can rewrite the above equations as follows:
a1h
1
σ c11h(s)
− 1
σ
p1(s)
=
a2h
1
σ c21h(s)
− 1
σ
p2(s)(s)
(78)
c11h(s)
− 1
σ
p1(s)
[
a1h
1
σ c11h(s)
σ−1
σ + a2h
1
σ c21h(s)
σ−1
σ
] 1−γσ
σ−1
=
= β
∑
s′
(
m1h(s)
p1(s′)
)− 1
σ 1
p1(s′)
[
a1h
1
σ
(
m1h(s)
p1(s′)
)σ−1
σ
+ a2h
1
σ
(
m2h(s)
p2(s′)
)σ−1
σ
] 1−γσ
σ−1
(79)
c21h(s)
− 1
σ
p2(s)e(s)
[
a1h
1
σ c11h(s)
σ−1
σ + a2h
1
σ c21h(s)
σ−1
σ
] 1−γσ
σ−1
=
= β
∑
s′
(
m2h(s)
p2(s′)
)− 1
σ 1
p2(s′)
[
a1h
1
σ
(
m1h(s)
p1(s′)
)σ−1
σ
+ a2h
1
σ
(
m2h(s)
p2(s′)
)σ−1
σ
] 1−γσ
σ−1
(80)
m1h(s) + e(s)m
2
h(s) + p
1(s)c11h(s) + p
2(s)e(s)c21h(s) = wh(s) (81)
The first equation shows that the marginal rate of substitution between the two goods
when young depends on the degree of home bias and the elasticity of substitution between
the two goods. An identical equation does hold in the baseline model. On the other hand,
equations (79) and (80) show the relationship between the marginal utility of consumption
today and the marginal utility of consumption tomorrow for the respective goods. These
also depend on the degree of the agent’s risk aversion43.
Finally, we can derive a modified version of Walras Law by aggregating the budget
constraints of the young (81) and assuming that the money markets clear:
p1(s)
(∑
h
c11h(s)− y1(s)
)
+ p2(s)e(s)
(∑
h
c21h(s)− y2(s)
)
= −M1 − e(s)M2
43Notice that, if we impose γσ = 1 in the above equations, we retrieve the first-order conditions of the baseline model.
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As long as the young’s excess supply for good 1 is equal to the real money balances of
currency 1 in each state
y1(s)−
∑
h
c11h(s) =
M1
p1(s)
the excess supply equation for good 2 clears automatically.
In this generalized version of the model, the utility function is not separable across
goods and therefore we cannot derive analytically the demand functions as in the baseline
model. Our equilibrium system is much larger than before and it is larger the higher is
number of states of nature:
Table 12: Equilibrium system
No. equations No. unknowns
4× 2× S (consolidated) F.O.C. 2× 2× S consumption allocations
2× S money equations 2× 2× S money holdings
1× S real money balances 2× S + 1× S nominal prices + exchange rates
4 consolidated first-order conditions need to hold for each agent, which have to be mul-
tiplied by the number of agents in the world economy and the states of nature. To those,
it corresponds an equivalent number of unknowns in terms of consumption allocations of
the two goods when young and the money holdings. Finally, the money markets’ clearing
equations and the equation for the real money balances for good 1 are matched by an
equal number of prices. If we analyze a two-states system as above, then our equilibrium
system consists of 22 equations and unknowns.
7.3.1 Robustness: alternative values of the risk aversion coefficient
The following table shows that the performance of the model is not particularly affected
if we chose alternative values for the coefficient of risk aversion.
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Table 13: Varying the coefficient of risk aversion: the net external position of the US
Trade balance % GDP Valuation effects % GDP ∆NFA % GDP
γ = 1 −3.2456 1.9195 −1.3261
γ = 2 −4.2796 2.4244 −1.8552
γ = 3 −4.6995 2.2801 −2.4194
γ = 4 −4.9746 1.8951 −3.0795
γ = 5 −5.1945 1.4524 −3.7421
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